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Abstract° 
MTS markets are an example of quote driven electronic order book markets for Government 
securities. Proposals are firm, immediately executable and aggregated in a limit order book. In this 
paper we analyse the evolution of the interaction between the order book and order flow by 
exploring the determinants of the flows of limit and market orders over three years. We are able to 
test several hypotheses coming from theoretical models. This is, to our knowledge, one of the first 
empirical test of these hypotheses based on Government bond data. We find that market and limit 
orders show positive autocorrelation and clustering as in Biais et al. (1995). No activity is clustered 
as well. This diagonal effect could also explain the positive impact of book depth near the quote on 
the flows of new limit orders. On the contrary, depth beyond the second best price seems to play no 
role in book dynamics. Furthermore, increasing competition, measured as an increase in the number 
of operators, has a negative effect on orders. In addition, we find mild support to the theoretical 
prediction of a positive effect of book depth on order aggressiveness. Best spread, instead, behaves 
consistently with theoretical models: a larger best spread encourages new limit orders inside-the-
quote. 
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1. Introduction 
The past decade witnessed the development of both the theoretical and the empirical literature 
about limit orders, the focus being the determinants and the consequences of trader’ decisions. In 
particular, as surveyed by Parlour and Seppi (2008), the main lines of research include issues such 
as price formation, liquidity, order book dynamics, information aggregation and inter-market 
competition. This paper aims at investigating the evolution of the order book by exploring the 
determinants of the flows of limit and market orders using data on Italian Treasury securities, traded 
on the wholesale Mercato Telematico dei titoli di Stato, (MTS). MTS markets are, in fact, an 
example of quote driven electronic order book. In Italy, about 25 primary dealer continuously post 
their quotes on the order book. 
Our theoretical framework is the literature on order book markets as in Parlour (1998), Goetller 
et al. (2005) and Foucault (1999). From the theoretical models in that literature, we single out some 
hypotheses and we test them on a unique dataset on transactions and proposals for the 10-year BTPs 
being traded on the MTS platform from January 2004 to November 2006. This is, to our 
knowledge, one of the first empirical test of these hypotheses based on Government bond data.  
We find evidence of the diagonal effect as in Biais et al. (1995). Market and limit orders show 
positive autocorrelation and clustering. No activity is clustered as well. The diagonal effect could 
also explain the positive impact of book depth at the best and at the second best price on flows of 
new limit orders. On the contrary, the volume available beyond the second best price does not have 
any positive effect on new limit orders any more. It is generally non significant. Therefore, the 
dynamics of limit orders are differentially affected by the book depth in the two best prices and in 
the rest of the book. Depth in the rest of the book seems to play no role in book dynamics, to be 
residual. This is striking, because most of the volume in the book is generally concentrated beyond 
the first two best prices. 
Another unexpected result is the negative effect of number of operators on limit and market 
orders. Number of operators indicates the number of primary dealers that are posting their quotes on 
the book. We would expect that an increase of that number increases the competition among them 
and stimulates new limit orders, better liquidity and higher trading. On the contrary, the impact of 
number of operators is opposite to our expectations. 
Furthermore, we find mild support to the theoretical prediction of a positive effect of book depth 
on order aggressiveness. When book depth increases, limit orders inside-the-quote are encouraged 
and limit orders behind-the-quote are discouraged. Operators try to gain time priority in execution, 
as predicted by theory. However, new limit orders at-the-quote increase as well. This does not fit 
with theoretical models, and could be a consequence of the diagonal effect previously mentioned. 
Finally, best spread has a positive impact on inside-the-quote limit orders. Larger best spread 
encourages new limit orders inside-the-quote, consistently with theoretical models. When best 
spread widens competition among primary dealers pushes spread down. 
The present paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly reviews the literature and singles out 
the hypotheses which we test, section 3 describes the market functioning and the dataset, section 4 
presents the variables of interest and the estimation methodology, section 5 presents our main 
results and section 6 conludes. 
 
2. Review of literature and tested hypotheses  
Our theoretical framework is the literature on order book markets as in Parlour (1998), Goetller 
et al. (2005) and Foucault (1999). From the theoretical models in that literature, we single out some 
hypotheses. Some implications of these models have been tested on stock or exchange rate markets. 
In this section we review theoretical and empirical findings to select their main assumptions. In 
particular we focus on the so called “diagonal” effect, as well as on the impact of different proxies 
of the state of the order book as measures and indicators of bid ask spread, book depth and market 
volatility. 
 Biais et al. (1995) work on data from the Paris Bourse, which is a computerized limit order 
 3 
market. They find that the probability that a given type of limit or market order is larger after that 
the same type of order was just submitted than it would be unconditionally. They refer to this 
evidence as the “diagonal effect”. Positive autocorrelation in order type is found on other limit order 
markets by many other papers: Ranaldo (2004), Ellul et al. (2007), Cao et al. (2008), among others. 
The papers previously mentioned work on databases which contain the whole history of the 
order book in a given time interval. Their empirical methodology is based on the observation of the 
order submission process and they analyse each limit or market order submitted in the given time 
interval. An alternative methodology is present in Ellul et al. (2007). They check whether order type 
correlation remains constant over longer periods of time. Therefore, they analyse the number of 
orders aggregated over 5 minute intervals. They find that the variations in the number of orders 
from a time interval to the subsequent one are negatively correlated. This evidence is considered to 
be consistent with the theoretical model in Parlour (1998). On our data set we are going to test:  
 
Hypothesis 1: diagonal effect in order type; 
1.1 negative serial correlation, as in Parlour (1998); 
1.2 positive serial correlation, as in Bias et al. (1995). 
 
The effect of book depth on order placement is investigated in Goettler et al. (2005). They 
present a discrete time model of a pure limit order market for an asset, where agents endogenously 
decide whether to buy or to sell, whether to submit limit orders and/or market orders, and the size of 
each order. The Markov perfect equilibrium of the model is solved numerically. The artificial time 
series generated by the model show interesting features and we are going to test some of them. The 
effect of the book depth on order placements is empirically analysed in: Ranaldo (2004), Ellul et al. 
(2007), Cao et al. (2008), among others. Our tested hypotheses are: 
 
Hypothesis 2: the book depth effect on market and limit orders; 
2.1 higher depth on the bid(ask) side increases the likelihood of market buys(sells) and decreases 
the likelihood of limit buys(sells); 
2.2 higher depth on the ask(bid) side leads to a higher frequency of buy(sell) orders, especially limit 
buy at quote; 
2.3 increased ask(bid) depth increases the likelihood of inside the quote limit buy orders; 
2.4 increased depth below the bid(ask) reduces the frequency of both market and aggressive limit 
buys(sells) and increases limit buys(sells) at and below the bid. 
 
Biais et al. (1995) observe that the conditional probability of new limit orders is larger when the 
bid-ask spread is large. On the contrary, the conditional probability of market orders is larger when 
the bid-ask spread is small. The model in Goettler et al. (2005) generates similar results. The 
evidence in Ellul et al. (2005), Hollifield et al. (2004), Ranaldo (2004) shows the effect of spreads 
on market and limit orders. Therefore, we test for the presence of a bid ask spread effect: 
 
Hypothesis 3: the bid ask spread effect on market and limit orders; 
3. wide spreads decrease the probability of market orders and increase the probability of limit 
orders. 
 
The effect of price volatility on bid ask spread is theoretically analysed in Foucault (1999). In 
this model, when the common value of the security changes, limit order submitters run the risk of 
being “picked off”. As a consequence, an increase in common value volatility causes bid ask spread 
to widen. Wald and Horrigan (2005) and Ranaldo (2004) find empirical support to the previous 
theoretical result. Ahn et al. (2001) find that the volume of limit order submissions is increasing in 
price volatility as well. Parlour and Seppi (2008), however, raise the suspicion of spurious 
 4 
correlation between volatility and volume. On our data set we are going to test: 
 
Hypothesis 4: the volatility effect on bid ask spread; 
4. high volatility increases bid ask spread. 
 
3. Market description and dataset 
Market description 
Italian Government finances its public deficit by issuing debt securities, on December 2006 they 
account for 80% of the public debt. The majority of trading occurs on wholesale markets. In 
particular, MTS is the leading market in Europe for the trading of fixed income securities with its 
over 1200 participants throughout Europe and average transaction volumes of up to 85 billion euro 
a day (single-counted)
1
. MTS was the first electronic market for Government securities and it was 
introduced in 1988 by the Italian Treasury as a platform for co-ordinating the activity of its primary 
dealer group within Italy
2
. 
MTS is a wholesale inter-dealer market, this means that individuals cannot access to it. We can 
distinguish two categories of participants, namely market makers and market takers. The former 
have to quote continuously two-way firm and immediately executable proposals for a selected 
subset of securities. The prices usually have to be posted for at least five hours per day and for a 
certain minimum quantity, and they are subject to maximum spread obligations depending on bonds 
maturity and liquidity. Each market maker can voluntarily quote other securities as well, facing in 
this case no constraint on price proposals. No market making obligation applies to market takers 
that can buy or sell at the given prices.  
MTS markets are an example of quote-driven electronic order book. This implies that market 
makers’ quotations are aggregated in a book according to price and side of the market. Since orders 
of round lots are executed according price priority and time priority (i.e. first in first out) and the 
quoted proposals are firm and immediately executable, we can say that MTS works as a limit order 
book. To facilitate the handling of large transactions, minimum lot sizes
3
 are high and trading rules 
grant traders a high degree of anonymity
4
. In effect, price proposals are anonymous and the identity 
of the counterparty of a trade is revealed only after the trade is executed for clearing and settlement 
purposes. In particular, if a central counterparty (CCP) is used, counterparties will not know 
identities; if the trade is settled bilaterally, only the counterparties will know identities. Moreover, 
market makers are not required to show the maximum quantity they are willing to trade: A 
participant may limit the display of his proposals to a partial amount (drip quantity) between the 
minimum trading lot and the total amount of the proposal (block quantity). Both cash and repo 
transactions are admitted
5
.  
Even if anonymity in transactions is guaranteed, the MTS system is highly transparent since 
quotes and transactions go directly to data vendors. As a result, they are immediately available, at a 
cost, to any market participants. Moreover, data provide the information about the first five levels of 
the order book. Daily figures, instead, are freely available on the MTS website. 
 
Dataset 
                                                     
1
 Source: MTSGroup web site. 
2
 Since the end of the nineties the MTS system expanded to other country markets and to high quality non government 
bond. For further details on the development of the MTS model see Coluzzi, Ginebri and Turco (2008) 
3
 Proposals must be formulated for a minimum quantity equal to € 10, € 5 or € 2.5 million depending on the instrument 
(bucket of maturity, liquid/ benchmark security). Odd lots are admitted but they are subject to market makers’ 
acceptance. 
4
Actually, this was not the case when MTS was founded. Indeed, in July 1997, 10 years after its inception, MTS 
switched to a new operation regime in which the names of market-makers who post bid and ask quotes for each security 
are not revealed. Scalia and Vacca (1999) analyze this change in the degree of transparency. 
5
 For additional details see “MTS Regulations - Governing the Wholesale Italian and Foreign Government Bond 
Market” available at http://www.mtsspa.it/content/about/download/mtsmarketrules.pdf. 
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In the present analysis we rely on data on transactions and proposals for the 10-year BTPs being 
traded on the MTS platform from January 1
st
, 2004 to November, 13
th
 2006. Data are provided by 
the Italian Ministry of Treasury that collects them directly from the MTS Italy market. Ad hoc 
software allows downloading the data at the desired frequency. This data source is somehow unique 
since it shows all the quotes and the relative quantities that are active on the market, while market 
participant are allowed to see only the first five levels of the book and drip quantities.  
In particular, for each day in the sample we have the on-the-run and the corresponding off-the-
run security. Proposals are observed as “snapshots” at a five-minute frequency between 8:30am and 
5.30pm; whereas transactions are time stamped to the second. Our dataset includes around 148,000 
observations. 
 
4. Variables of interest and empirical strategy 
Variables 
Since we are interested in the evolution of the order book,  we start analyzing seven different 
order variables: new best limit bid orders, new best limit ask orders, buy market orders, sell market 
orders, cancellations of best bid orders, cancellations of best ask orders, no activity. New best limit 
orders and cancellations are computed by comparing, on each side of the book, the best size
6
 in 
each snapshot with the size available at the same price in the previous snapshot. When the 
difference is positive, we assign the value of the difference at the variable new best limit orders. If 
the difference is negative, we assign the value of the difference at the variable cancellations of best 
orders. No activity is an ordinal variable taking value 1 if the best size on one side of the book is 
equal to the size available at the same price in the previous snapshot, value 2 if the same occurred 
on the other side of the book, and 0 otherwise. Finally, market orders simply add up trading 
volumes in the time interval between each snapshot and the previous one. Buy(sell) market orders 
measure the volume of contracts which were executed against the best ask(bid) limit orders 
available.  
In our extended analysis, instead, we differentiate limit orders by the aggressiveness of limit 
price and introduce six new variables: new limit bid orders inside-the-quote, new limit ask orders 
at-the-quote, new limit bid orders at-the-quote, new limit ask orders at-the-quote, new limit bid 
orders behind-the-quote, new limit ask orders behind-the-quote. The six new variables substitute for 
the two limit order variables. Therefore, in our extended analysis we have eleven order variables. 
The limit order aggressiveness is assessed by comparing the best spread in each snapshot with the 
best spread in the previous snapshot. When best spread shrinks, new best limit orders, as defined 
above, are assigned, on each side of the market, to the variable new limit orders inside-the-quote. 
When best spread loosens, new best limit orders are assigned to the variable new limit orders 
behind-the-quote. Otherwise, new best limit orders are assigned to the variable new limit orders at-
the-quote. The notation of limit order variables is reported in Panel A of Table 1. 
In order to test the hypotheses previously posited, in our empirical analysis we use, as 
explanatory variables, lagged values of the order variables previously defined and a set of measures 
and indicators capturing the state of the order book. These latter are defined in Panel B of Table 1 
and represent different dimensions of the liquidity of the order book. In particular, we rely on 
measures of market activity as the number of updates,  the number of operators and measures of 
price change, as well as measures more directly quantifying how tight and how deep the order book 
is, as best spread and depth variables respectively. In effect, since for each quote we know the block 
quantity, we are able to provide particularly accurate measures of the depth of the market when 
distinguishing depth according to its position in the limit order book. Other measures, as steepness,  
capture the breadth of the limit order book, which is the variety, multiplicity of limit orders. Slope, 
instead, measures the increase in marginal quoted price an operator has to bear for trading an 
additional quantity, thus it captures both breadth and depth dimensions. Market quality index 
combines depth and tightness and measures the average quote quantity per percentage point of 
                                                     
6 
Ask(Bid) best size is the quantity available at the best price on the ask(bid) side of the book.  
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spread.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
Figure 1 displays the daily patter of some of the liquidity measures we use to capture the state of 
the order book. All the liquidity measures exhibit intra-day seasonality. In particular, in the top left 
panel best spread shows a sort of U-shaped pattern. The highest value is achieved at the beginning 
of the day and it is around 4 ticks, then after 9:00 it falls at 2 ticks and it gradually rises again after 
15:00. This is consistent with the empirical findings of Huang et al. (2002) for the USA Treasury 
Interdealer Broker market (IDB) and Ranaldo (2004) for the Swiss Stock Exchange. The peak 
around 14:30 coincides with the opening of US financial markets. Likewise, depth variables show a 
hump-shaped pattern
7
. The number of market operators, instead, is higher in the morning and falls 
after 14:00, while the absolute price change, which can be interpreted as a proxy for market 
volatility, follows an opposite pattern. A similar pattern of seasonality is followed by our order 
variables.  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
To compensate for this, all the variables are deseasonalized using the method proposed by 
Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1992) and later applied by Lo and Sapp (2007). In the first step of the 
procedure each variable, wt, is regressed on a set of dummy and time trend variables, xt, which 
includes nine hourly dummies, one for each of the hours between 8:00 and 17:00, five daily 
dummies, twelve monthly dummies, and three yearly dummies: 
ttt
uxw +′= β . 
In the second step, the residuals in the first step, 
t
uˆ , are used in the following regression: 
ttt
vxu +′= γˆlog  
Then a final linear transformation is performed to calculate the adjusted variables, a
t
w : 
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where w  and 
w
σ  are respectively the sample average and the standard deviation of wt, u  is the 
sample average of the residuals in the first step, 
c
uˆ
σ  is the standard deviation of the residuals in the 
first step corrected by ct, and ct is defined by: 



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≡
2
ˆ
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t
t
x
c . 
The procedure removes the effect of seasonality on mean and variance. However, adjusted series 
have the same sample mean and variance as the unadjusted ones.  
Summary statistics of the variables of interest are reported in Table 2. We can note that, 
although the average values are statistically different at the 10% level, the bid and the ask sides of 
the market behave symmetrically, but the maximum values are larger on the ask side of the market. 
An exception is the difference between new limit ask and new limit bid, which is not statistically 
different from zero. When distinguishing limit orders by aggressiveness, the difference for orders at 
the quote is not statistically different from zero as well. As in many other studies on stock markets, 
for instance Biais et al. (1995), and on Government bonds, for instance Fleming and Mizrach 
(2007), the quantity available for trade is concentrated in the second level of the order book and 
beyond. In the following, we will check if this different distribution of size in the order book has an 
impact on the order dynamics.  
                                                     
7
 The behavior of the bid side size variables is analogous to that reported in the figure for the ask side ones. 
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TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Empirical strategy  
Initially, we estimate a system of seven equations with SUR, which allows for contemporaneous 
cross-equation error correlation. As each equation has the same set of explanatory variables, SUR 
regression coefficients are equivalent to OLS coefficients. The dependent variables are the seven 
order variables previously defined
8
. In all the seven equations, the explanatory variables are the first 
lag of the seven order variables and the first lag of the variables representing the state of the order 
book. 
In the extended analysis we estimate a system of eleven equations to keep into account order 
aggressiveness. Six new order variables substitute for best limit ask orders and best limit bid orders. 
The new variables are new best limit ask orders inside-the-quote, new best limit ask orders at-the-
quote, new best limit ask orders behind-the-quote, new best limit bid orders inside-the-quote, new 
best limit ask orders at-the-quote, new best limit ask orders behind-the-quote. The explanatory 
variables remain the same variables used in the seven equation system. 
 
5. Results 
The seven equations system 
Table 2 reports the regression coefficients in the seven equation system
9
. We find evidence of 
the diagonal effect in Biais et al. (1995). If we consider the sub-system of the first four equations, 
that is we concentrate on limit and market orders, the lagged value of dependent variable is 
significant and the absolute value of the coefficient is generally the highest among the coefficients 
of the four lagged dependent variables. This shows the presence of clustering among limit and 
market orders. 
Following the methodology in Ellul et al. (2007), we also took the first differences of the 
dependent variables and we estimated a new system of equations. However, we found no evidence 
of negative autoregressive coefficients. Therefore, hypothesis 1.1 is not supported by our data. 
No activity is clustered as well. The evidence on cancellations is less clear. The diagonal effect 
is present on the bid side, but it is not on the opposite side. On the contrary, some regularities 
emerge about the effects of limit and market orders on cancellations. A thorough interpretation of 
such regularities is currently missing. 
When turning to the depth effect, we do not find any empirical support to the above posited 
hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2. An increase in best size has neither any negative effect on the limit orders 
on the same side of the book, nor a positive effect on the limit orders on the other side. Furthermore, 
market orders are not affected by best size on both sides of the book. The unique empirical 
regularity is a positive effect of best size on new limit orders on the same side of the book. 
However, this could be a consequence of the diagonal effect previously mentioned. 
Among explanatory variables, the volume at the second best price and in the rest of the book 
were included. We wanted to check whether depth beyond the best price has the same effect on 
order placement as depth at the best price. Interestingly, second size has exactly the same effects on 
limit and market orders as best size has. On the contrary, worst size, that is the volume available 
beyond the second best price, does not have any positive effect on new limit orders any more. The 
effect of worst size is generally non significant. Therefore, the dynamics of limit orders are 
differentially affected by the size on the two best prices and in the rest of the book. Worst size 
seems to play no role in book dynamics, to be residual. This is striking, because most of the volume 
in the book is concentrated in worst size. 
Our third hypothesis relates to the bid ask spread effect. In the seven order system an increase in 
                                                     
8
 Table 1 summarises notation. The no_activity becomes a continuous variable after the seasonal adjustment procedure. 
9
 We report only the regression coefficients in the case of on-the-run series. We estimated our system on off-the-run 
data and we obtained similar results. Furthermore, we divided trading day in two parts: hours of trading concentration 
and rest of the day. We estimated our system on both parts and we obtained similar results as well. 
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best spread has a negative effect both on market and limit orders. The negative effect on market 
orders is consistent with theory; on the contrary, the negative effect on limit orders is not. The 
results of the eleven order system, however, give a wider support to theory, as we will show later. 
We included among explanatory variables two other liquidity indicators: slope and market 
quality index. None of them show the opposite effect on market and limit orders which is predicted 
by theory. However, slope has the expected impact on limit orders. A higher slope indicates a fall in 
liquidity, and, consequently, lower liquidity encourages new limit orders. 
Finally, we test the volatility effect focusing on measures of price change. We do not find any 
impact of price change, either in absolute or in nominal value, on order placement. This evidence is 
not inconsistent with theory. The model in Foucault (1999) forecasts an impact of volatility on 
spread, not on limit orders. However, we were expecting that the effect of volatility on spreads 
could have some consequence on limit orders. Our expectations were not fulfilled. 
We included in our analysis three other indicators of book activity: number of updates, number 
of operators, steepness. Number of updates measures the book modifications occurred in the 
previous five minutes, and, as expected, it is positively related to market and limit orders. Steepness 
is a measure of breadth, of variety of proposals. In a previous analysis we have shown that it is not 
correlated with liquidity
10
 and it is strongly related with the number of market participants. Its 
impact on order placement is not clear. Finally, we find a negative effect of number of operators on 
limit and market orders. Number of operators indicates the number of primary dealers that are 
posting their quotes on the book. We would expect that an increase of this number increases the 
competition among them and stimulates new limit orders, better liquidity and higher trading. On the 
contrary, the impact of number of operators is opposite to our expectations
11
. 
 
The eleven equation system 
Table 3 reports the regression coefficients obtained in the case of eleven equations. We 
concentrate on the regression coefficients of the six new order variables and we find a couple of 
interesting results. First, best size has a positive effect on the inside-the-quote limit orders on the 
same side of the book and a negative effect on the behind-the-quote orders. This seems to be 
consistent with hypothesis 2.3. In the theoretical model by Goettler at al. (2005), when volume at-
the-quote is large, operators have an incentive to place limit orders inside-the-quote in order to gain 
time priority in order execution. However, we find a positive impact of best size on the at-the-quote 
limit orders as well. This is not consistent with theory, and, as previously mentioned, could be a 
consequence of the diagonal effect. Therefore, the support to hypothesis 2.3 is partial. The “jump 
the queue” effect is present, however, the diagonal effect seems to dominate. 
Furthermore, the estimated coefficients are not consistent with hypothesis 2.4. Increased depth 
at second best price or in the rest of the book does not have any negative effect on market and 
aggressive limit orders, and does not increase limit orders at- and behind-the-quote. Moreover, size 
beyond best price does not show any systematic effect on order aggressiveness. 
Finally, best spread has a positive impact on inside-the-quote limit orders and a negative impact 
on at- and behind-the-quote. This is consistent with hypothesis 3. Although the impact of best 
spread is negative on the aggregated volume of limit orders at the best price, a larger best spread 
encourages new limit orders inside-the-quote, consistently with theoretical models. When best 
spread widens competition among primary dealers pushes spread down. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the present analysis we explored the determinants of order flow on Italian Treasury securities 
wholesale secondary market. We were able to verify some implications of theoretical models on the 
order book dynamics.  
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 This is clear observing Figure 1. For a more detailed analysis see Coluzzi, Ginebri and Turco (2008).  
11
 A confirmation of the weak relationship between number of market participants and market liquidity can be found in 
Coluzzi, Ginebri and Turco (2008). 
 9 
In future research we plan to focus on the dynamics of the order book behind the best quote and 
on the information content of the limit order about future short-term returns movements. 
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Table 1. Notation 
Panel A:Dependent variables 
limit_ask = new best limit ask orders; 
limit_bid = new best limit bid orders; 
market_buy = buy market orders; 
market_sell = sell market orders; 
cancel_ask = cancellations of best ask orders; 
cancel_bid = cancellations of best bid orders; 
no_activity = no activity; 
 
ask_inside_the_quote = new best limit ask orders inside-the-quote; 
ask_at_the_quote = new best limit ask orders at-the-quote; 
ask_behind_the_quote = new best limit ask orders behind-the-quote; 
bid_inside_the_quote = new best limit bid orders inside-the-quote; 
bid_at_the_quote = new best limit ask orders at-the-quote; 
bid_behind_the_quote = new best limit ask orders behind-the-quote. 
 
Panel B: Explanatory variables 
Abbreviation Definition 
best_spread = best spread difference between the lowest price on the ask side of 
the book and highest price on the bid side 
nu_updates = number of updates the number quotes update between two subsequent 
snapshots 
ask_best_size = ask best size volume of limit orders available at the best price on 
the ask side 
bid_best_size = bid best size volume of limit orders available at the best price on 
the bid side 
ask_snd_size = ask second size volume of limit orders available at the second best 
price on the ask side 
bid_snd_size = bid second size volume of limit orders available at the second best 
price on the bid side 
ask_worst_size = ask worst size volume of limit orders available on the book beyond 
the second best price on the ask side 
bid_worst_size = bid worst size volume of limit orders available on the book beyond 
the second best price on the bid side 
nu_operators = number of operators number of market operators  
price_change = price change change of the average midquote with respect to the 
previous snapshot 
abs_price_change = absolute price change price change in absolute value 
steepness = steepness the distance between the best and the worst price 
scaled by the midpoint between the two and averaged 
between the bid and ask sides of the market 
slope = slope the distance between the best and the worst price 
scaled on the difference between total volume minus 
the volume at the best price and averaged between the 
bid and ask sides of the market 
mkt_qlt_indx = market quality index average quoted quantity scaled on the average 
percentage spread 
time = time number of minutes since the first snapshot (i.e. 
8.30am)  
sqr_time = squared time squared value of time 
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Note: Most of the variables are analytically defined in Coluzzi, Ginebri and Turco (2008), Appendix B. 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
num obs mean st. dev. median min max p-value
limit_ask 74811 20.210 27.539 9.122 -7.205 333.931
limit_bid 74811 20.227 26.830 9.596 -7.754 239.639
ask_inside_the_quote 74811 2.417 9.987 0.003 -0.200 231.059
bid_inside_the_quote 74811 2.602 10.286 -0.010 -0.177 155.471
ask_at_the_quote 74811 15.459 26.023 0.897 -4.139 312.920
bid_at_the_quote 74811 15.407 25.391 0.670 -4.020 234.529
ask_behind_the_quote 74811 2.334 11.818 0.037 -0.228 237.860
bid_behind_the_quote 74811 2.217 11.375 0.092 -0.349 220.928
market_buy 74811 1.458 5.611 0.110 -0.639 279.720
market_sell 74811 1.360 5.486 0.100 -0.539 246.769
cancel_ask 74811 -11.233 25.383 -0.605 -641.815 4.639
cancel_bid 74811 -10.987 25.203 -0.653 -389.698 5.509
no_activity 74811 0.201 0.500 0.012 -0.020 5.031
best_spread 75139 0.025 0.010 0.022 -0.014 0.370
nu_updates 75139 222.888 166.923 192.446 -107.984 2577.490
ask_best_size 75139 37.493 30.756 28.873 -5.902 388.124
bid_best_size 75139 37.004 29.589 29.108 -4.158 258.494
ask_snd_size 73801 73.990 38.979 73.813 -43.724 393.450
bid_snd_size 73793 76.605 39.091 77.226 -49.489 263.820
ask_worst_size 73801 48.308 37.910 41.107 -32.456 371.157
bid_worst_size 73793 45.122 37.684 36.990 -24.627 349.408
nu_operators 75139 19.302 7.633 20.530 -43.412 56.127
abs_price_change 74258 0.015 0.016 0.011 -0.002 0.286
price_change 74258 0.000 0.021 0.000 -0.277 0.288
steepness 73261 0.025 0.007 0.025 -0.002 0.059
slope 73261 0.029 0.029 0.023 -0.008 1.154
mkt_qlt_indx 75139 9.433 3.795 9.379 -6.990 42.459
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.905
0.000
0.698
0.051
0.001
0.060
 
Note: The table report summary statistics for the on-the-run 10 year BTPs’ database at a 5-minute frequency. The p-
value refers to a test for the difference in mean between the variables on the bid and ask sides of the order book. 
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Table 3. SUR estimation on 7 order variables 
 
 limit_ask limit_bid market_buy market_sell cancel_ask cancel_bid no_activity 
lag_limit_ask 0.049 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.015 -0.006 0.000 
lag_limit_bid 0.011 0.027 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.022 0.000 
lag_market_buy 0.021 0.040 0.136 0.030 -0.079 0.076 -0.004 
lag_market_sell 0.007 0.046 0.049 0.141 0.080 -0.042 -0.004 
lag_cancel_ask -0.031 0.015 0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.013 0.000 
lag_cancel_bid 0.007 -0.016 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.016 0.000 
lag_no_activity -0.683 -1.247 -0.013 -0.087 0.248 0.442 0.101 
lag_best_spread -216.284 -182.811 -23.955 -36.335 70.200 55.328 2.349 
lag_nu_updates 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
lag_ask_best_size 0.183 0.013 0.001 0.002 -0.044 -0.021 -0.001 
lag_bid_best_size -0.012 0.173 0.002 0.003 -0.009 0.007 -0.001 
lag_ask_snd_size 0.034 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.115 -0.024 0.000 
lag_bid_snd_size -0.014 0.029 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.076 0.000 
lag_ask_worst_size -0.003 -0.012 -0.001 0.000 -0.058 -0.007 0.000 
lag_bid_worst_size -0.040 -0.011 0.000 -0.001 0.011 -0.016 0.000 
lag_nu_operators -0.105 -0.088 -0.019 -0.015 0.111 0.034 0.001 
lag_abs_price_change 9.105 11.259 1.916 0.612 22.896 12.682 -0.462 
lag_price_change 12.405 -6.932 -0.819 -0.832 12.155 -18.312 0.007 
lag_steepness -2.322 -28.152 21.203 17.358 -64.204 -91.576 2.600 
lag_slope 15.869 15.661 3.683 2.285 -28.824 -20.158 0.336 
lag_mkt_qlt_indx 0.212 0.100 0.036 0.034 -0.311 -0.300 0.004 
Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at 1% level; coefficients in italics are significant at 5% level. Data refer to on-the-run BTP 10 years. The Breush-Pagan test does not 
accept the hypothesis of independent equations. 
 
 
 15 
Table 4. SUR estimation on 11 order variables 
 
 
ask_inside 
_the_quote 
ask_at 
_the_quote 
ask_behind 
_the_quote 
bid_inside 
_the_quote 
bid_at_ 
the_quote 
bid_behind 
_the_quote 
lag_limit_ask 0.006 0.040 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.002 
lag_limit_bid 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.002 
lag_market_buy 0.007 -0.078 0.094 0.038 0.015 -0.010 
lag_market_sell 0.032 -0.010 -0.015 0.001 -0.059 0.097 
lag_cancel_ask 0.001 -0.025 -0.005 -0.001 0.021 -0.004 
lag_cancel_bid 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.010 -0.006 
lag_no_activity -0.004 -0.537 -0.099 -0.054 -1.051 -0.074 
lag_best_spread 101.255 -162.856 -138.493 106.313 -161.594 -108.273 
lag_nu_updates 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.003 
lag_ask_best_size 0.047 0.147 -0.015 0.028 -0.009 -0.008 
lag_bid_best_size 0.028 -0.031 -0.012 0.062 0.126 -0.020 
lag_ask_snd_size 0.002 0.042 -0.014 -0.006 0.014 -0.002 
lag_bid_snd_size -0.004 -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 0.037 -0.013 
lag_ask_worst_size 0.002 0.006 -0.014 -0.013 -0.011 0.010 
lag_bid_worst_size -0.008 -0.038 0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.014 
lag_nu_operators -0.009 -0.046 -0.025 0.018 -0.074 -0.010 
lag_abs_price_change 1.063 -0.127 11.333 2.703 6.677 3.828 
lag_price_change 0.257 18.977 -7.288 -1.407 -8.265 3.910 
lag_steepness -45.984 -35.272 95.283 -29.328 -15.567 40.986 
lag_slope 1.015 9.218 6.108 5.882 7.490 3.517 
lag_mkt_qlt_indx -0.072 0.089 0.234 -0.036 0.065 0.128 
Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at 1% level; coefficients in italics are significant at 5% level. Data refer to on-the-run BTP 10 years. The Breush-Pagan test does not 
accept the hypothesis of independent equations. 
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Figure 1. Daily pattern of the state of the book 
 
Note: Five minute data are averaged over the whole sample of the on-the-run 10 year BTPs. The spreads are measured 
in ticks. The depth measures are expressed in millions of euro. In the bottom left panel the left scale refers to the 
absolute price change measured in ticks and the right scale to the number of operators. 
